Introduction
Dynamical collapse theories, such as the GRW theory (Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber 1986) , the Continuous Spontaneous Localization theory, or CSL (Pearle 1989; Ghirardi, Pearle and Rimini 1990) , Quantum Mechanics with Universal Spontaneous Localization, or QMUPL (Diósi 1989) , and their respective relativistic extensions (Dove 1996; Dove and Squires 1996; Tumulka 2006; Bedingham 2011a,b; Pearle 2015) modify the usual deterministic, unitary quantum dynamics in such as to produce something like the textbook collapse process. See Bassi and Ghirardi (2003) , Bassi et al. (2013) , and Ghirardi (2016) for overviews.
If some sort of dynamical collapse theory is correct, what might the world be like? Can a theory of that sort be a quantum state monist theory, or must such theories supplement the quantum state ontology with additional beables? In a previous work (Myrvold 2018) , I defended quantum state monism. The view defended involves a natural extension of the usual eigenstate-eigenvalue link, which provides a sufficient condition for a quantum state to be one in which a system has a definite value of some dynamical variable, namely, that the quantum state be an eigenstate of that variable. The usual eigenstate-eigenvalue link leaves it open what to say about states that are not eigenstates. A state that is not an eigenstate of some dynamical variable, but is very close to an eigenstate, exhibits behaviour that closely approximates that of the eigenstate. In accordance with a proposal of , in such a case the quantity may be treated as if it were definite. But specification of the quantities that are definite or near-definite does not exhaustively specify the condition of the physical world, as there are matters of fact about such things as the spread of values of a dynamical variable in a given state. The natural ontology for a collapse theory is a distributional ontology along the lines advocated by Philip Pearle (2009) . On such an account, dynamical quantities such as charge or mass within a specified region do not take on precise values, but, rather, have associated with them a distribution of values.
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This chapter discusses the extension of such a picture to the context of a relativistic spacetime. This will not be presumed to be Minkowski spacetime, as we will want to consider curved spacetimes; furthermore, we do not wish to exclude the possibility of discrete spacetimes. What the spacetimes we will consider have in common is a relativistic causal structure. In particular, we will focus attention on spacetimes in which, for any spacetime point p, there are temporally extended processes that go on at spacelike separation from p, prohibited by the spacetime structure from either causally influencing p or being influenced by it.
In Section 2 I give a brief recapitulation of the argument, presented in more detail in Myrvold (2018) , for distributional ontology. This is based on a principle that, I claim, ought to be respected by any project of seeking to draw ontological conclusions from non-fundamental physical theories, a principle that I call the Principle of Metaphysical Continuity, outlined in section 2.1. This principle permits us to draw conclusions about ontology for non-ideal collapse theories-that is, collapse theories that yield, not exact eigenstates of the dynamical quantities one would like to be definite, but close approximations to them-from ontological considerations regarding ideal collapse theories. In Section 3 is presented a fairly general schema for collapse theories in a relativistic spacetime. Finally, in section 4, we turn to the identification of local beables for theories of that sort.
The case for distributional ontology

Ontology for non-fundamental theories
If we want to know something about the make-up of the world, we can do no better than to look to our best scientific theories. This poses a prima facie problem, however, as there is not, and never has been, a convincing candidate on the table for a complete and fundamental physical theory.
One reaction to this fact might be take on the task of giving an account of what the world would be like if such-and-such physical theory were a complete and fundamental theory. On this view, metaphysics is a subgenre of fiction, though stripped of plot and character and, indeed, of everything that motivates us to read fiction. This strikes me as an uninteresting enterprise, except insofar as considerations of unrealistic theories yields insights regarding the ontology of the actual world. For instance: though we currently lack a theory that incorporates both quantum and gravitational phenomena, one could, perhaps, investigate the structure of a world in which there is 3 no gravitation and in which the standard model of quantum field theory is exactly correct. But such a world would be a lonely and boring place, as it would contain no stars or planets, and, since virtually all nuclei heavier than helium are formed in stars, would contain little in the way of chemical reactions. We could not ask what it would like to be a denizen of a world like that, because a world like that would contain no life.
Another reaction might be to abandon all ontological inquiry as hopeless, on the grounds that we can expect future theories to generate radical ontological shifts. This strikes me as overly pessimistic. The objects dealt with in classical physics do, after all, exist, even if their behaviour is not exactly what classical physics would lead one to expect. Any theory that can lay claim to the title of a viable successor theory to our current theories is obliged to recover the empirical successes of our current theories, and, as long as we resist the temptation to draw stronger conclusions from our current physical theories than we have warrant for, there are reasons for optimism that those conclusions will weather the storms of future theory change.
This sort of attitude recommends due caution in our metaphysical musings. The evidence we have concerning our physical theories warrants only the conclusions that they hold to a good approximation in their domains of applicability, and that any viable successor theory will have entail something like the current theories within those domains. If our current theories have metaphysical consequences that are sensitive to the precise details of the theory, consequences that would not hold if the theory were slightly different, then we have no warrant for taking those consequences to hold of our world. Our metaphysical conclusions should satisfy a Principle of Metaphysical Continuity: they should be robust under small perturbations of theory. This is a principle that we will put to work, in Subsection 2.3, below.
The requirement of local beables
Consider a region of spacetime that is bounded in both time and space, say, the spatial region inside your office, during some specified hour of time. Of the things that are true of that bounded spacetime region, some are local to that region: they refer only to intrinsic properties of that region.
These are to be contrasted with things that involve relations to states of affairs outside the region, or either implicit or explicit reference to things outside.
For example, on the usual way of thinking about things, if your office, during the hour we are considering, contains a cabinet-shaped piece of steel, this is a local fact about that spacetime region. If the proposition that the spacetime region under consideration contains an object of that sort is true, its truth is compatible with completely arbitrary states of affairs outside the region, and its truth value cannot be changed by goings-on outside the region unless those goings-on have an effect on local matters within the region. By contrast, if the contents of your office are approximately 150 million kilometers from the nearest star, this fact is clearly a fact about relations between the things in your office and the world outside of it. A symptom of this fact is that it can be changed by making changes outside your office that don't affect anything within it.
By a local beable, I will mean something that is, in this sense, local to a bounded spacetime region. The ontology of a physical theory might contain both local and nonlocal beables. If it is the case that, for an arbitrarily fine covering of spacetime with open sets, the full ontology of the theory supervenes on beables that are local to elements of that covering, we will say that the ontology satisfies the condition of separability (see Myrvold 2011 for further discussion).
Quantum state realism entails rejection of separability. It does not follow that there are no local beables. For one thing, there could be local beables postulated in addition to the quantum state. But also, some aspects of the quantum state-in particular, the reduced state that is the restriction of the state to observables pertaining to a bounded spacetime region-might be counted as local beables.
Need there be any local beables at all? If we are willing to countenance a rejection of separability, might we not go all the way, and accept a radically holistic view in which there are no beables intrinsic to any region short of the whole of spacetime?
The difficulty with this is that, if the theory is meant to be one that is in principle comprehensive, it must have room for such things as experimental apparatus that is subject to local manipulations, and whose experimental readouts are, presumably, matters of fact local to the laboratory. In the absence of things like these, the theory runs the risk of undermining its own evidential base (see Maudlin 2007 for a lucid discussion of this point).
A brief comment, before we continue. What it means to say that a structure found within a physical theory plays the role of spacetime for that theory is that it has the appropriate connections with dynamics. In speaking of spacetime, I will always mean that structure that plays the role in 5 the theory of affording spatiotemporal relations such as distances, temporal intervals, causal connectability, and the like, distances and temporal intervals and causal relations that are relevant to the dynamics. It is necessary to say this because it has been claimed that quantum theory motivates the introduction of a so-called "fundamental space" or "fundamental arena," a highdimensional space that would be such that quantum states involve nothing more than assignments of local beables to points in that fundamental space (see Albert 1996 and the various contributions to Ney and Albert, eds., 2013) . In a quantum theory, even if such a space can be found, it is not the structure on which the distances, temporal intervals, and causal relations relevant to the dynamics are defined. For that reason, such a space, even if it were to exist, is not spacetime in the sense of the word being used in this chapter. Hence, even if such a space did exist, a quantum state realist ontology violates separability, as we are using the term.
Ontology for ideal collapse theories
According to the textbook collapse postulate, after an experiment the quantum state of the system subjected to the experiment is an eigenstate of the observable whose value has been obtained. Naively, one might expect a dynamical collapse theory to be like that. There are good reasons for thinking that this is an unattainable goal. If, however, we could have a theory like that-a theory that yielded eigenstates of an appropriate dynamical variable-then, I claim, there would be no problem of ontology for the theory, once we have settled on a choice of dynamical variable to collapse to eigenstates of (a suitable choice seems to be that of a smeared mass density, as advocated by Ghirardi, Grassi, and Benatti 1995) . That there is any question about the ontology for a collapse theory is an aspect of what has been called the tails problem (first flagged as an issue by Shimony 1991, and Lower 1991) , which stems from the fact that collapse theories do not lead to eigenstates of familiar dynamical quantities.
Consider a quantum theory on a discrete spacetime, one on which space consists of elementary cells of size vastly smaller than the scales on which we deal with things. Suppose we had a collapse theory that tended to suppress superpositions of distinct mass densities smeared over regions (which could consist of a great many of these elementary cells) of order 10 -5 cm, small on human scale, but large compared to atomic dimensions. Suppose that our collapse theory induced collapse, within a finite time, to eigenstates of the operators corresponding to total mass within 6 regions of this size, and that states that are not eigenstates of these mass operators could persist only for a minuscule fraction of a second.
On such a theory, for every region of space of sufficient size, the quantum state would, almost all of the time, be an eigenstate corresponding to a definite mass within that region. Hence, by the eigenstate-eigenvalue link, there would be a matter of fact about the amount of mass within that region. Thus, a possible state of the room in which I am sitting would be one in which there was a desk-shaped region of higher mass density than its surroundings. Provided that these regions of high mass density exhibited the right sort of dynamical behaviour, there would be no problem in identifying them with desks, chairs, and laboratory equipment, and there would be no problem of ontology for collapse theories.
Distributional ontology
Prospects are dim for a viable collapse theory that yields precise eigenstates of total mass in any bounded region, or, indeed, precise eigenstates of any local beables. A collapse theory can, however, yield close approximations to eigenstates of appropriate local beables, such as mass smeared over sufficiently large regions.
Whether the dynamics is linear, unitary, and deterministic, as in the Schrödinger equation, or non-unitary and stochastic, initial states that are close to each other, in Hilbert space norm, evolve in approximately the same way. Thus, a state that is close to being an eigenstate of a given dynamical quantity will evolve in approximately the same way as the eigenstate that it is close to.
If we accept (as we should; see Myrvold 2018 for a fuller discussion, and also Albert 2015:
127ff.) that to be a be a physical body is nothing more and nothing less than to have a certain place in a network of dynamical and causal relations of an appropriate sort, and if we accept (as we should) that there would be no problem of interpretation of an ideal collapse theory that yielded eigenstates of the right sort of dynamical quantities, then, by the Principle of Metaphysical Continuity, we should accept that regions of space whose states are very near to eigenstates of total mass can serve as physical objects just as well as would regions of space in exact eigenstates of total mass.
Considerations such as this have led to a proposed modification of the eigenstate-eigenvalue link.
7 if one wishes to attribute objective properties to individual systems one has to accept that such an attribution is legitimate even when the mean value of the projection operator on the eigenmanifold associated to the eigenvalue corresponding to the attributed property is not exactly equal to 1, but is extremely close to it Pearle 1990: 1298) .
This modification has been dubbed, by Clifton and Monton (1999) , the fuzzy link.
To say that we can ascribe a property to a system when the quantum state is such that its variance is negligibly small requires that there be a matter of fact about what the variance is.
Considerations of this sort suggest a revision of the way we think about dynamical quantities, along the lines advanced by Pearle (2009) . On this view, dynamical variables typically do not take on sharp values as they would classically. What they have, instead, is a distribution associated with them. These distributions, though having the formal characteristics of probability distributions, are to be thought of, not as a probability distribution over precise but unknown possessed values, but as reflecting a physical, ontological, lack of determinacy about what the value is. A limiting case would be the classical case, in which the distribution is a delta function.
On this view, the value of every dynamical variable is distributional. A collapse theory will tend to narrow the spread of the distributions of some of these quantities. When the distribution is sufficiently narrow, things will be almost exactly as if the quantity has a precise value, and, under such circumstances, we can treat the variable as if it does possess a precise value. In seeking objects that behave like our familiar macroscopic objects, it is to those variables that we should direct our attention. But the spread-out distributions of the other variables are no less part of physical reality.
Primitive ontology as an alternative?
Given a family of operators ˆ( ) M x , corresponding to a smeared mass-density centred at the point x , for any quantum state  one can define a function () m x , whose value at the point x is equal to the expectation value of ˆ( ) M x in state  . When Ghirardi, Grassi, and Benatti (1995) introduced the smeared mass-density as a basis for the ontology of collapse theories, their proposal was an application of the fuzzy eigenstate-eigenvalue link. They argued that the quantity () m x behaves like a mass density when-and only when-the variance of ˆ( ) M x is sufficiently small as to be negligible, in which case the mass density is said to be objective. When this condition is not satisfied, the quantity () m x , though well-defined, cannot be interpreted as a mass density, as other systems do not behave as if a quantity of mass corresponding to () m x is present. In some later works (Ghirardi and Grassi 1996; Ghirardi 1997a Ghirardi , 1997b ) the mass density is said to be "accessible" if its variance is sufficiently small (this shift is attributed by Ghirardi and Grassi 1996, fn. 5, to a conversation with S. Goldstein).
There is, at least apparently, a rival interpretation of () m x . On this view, introduced by Goldstein (1998) and discussed extensively by Allori et al. (2008) , a mass density equal at every point to the expectation value of ˆ( ) M x is posited as additional, primitive ontology, over and above the quantum state.
The quantities () m x are well-defined for any quantum state. However, since, in situations in which the objectivity, or accessibility, condition is not satisfied-that is, situations in which the variance of ˆ( ) M x is not small enough to be neglected-other objects do not respond as if a mass density equal to () m x is present, () m x acts like a mass density only when the accessibility condition is satisfied. Something that doesn't act like a mass density isn't a mass density. Thus, on the supposed rival interpretation, despite what is said, a mass density is present only when there is a mass density present on the original, quantum state monist proposal, that is, when the accessibility condition is satisfied. The proposal to take () m x as additional, primitive ontology does not present a genuine alternative to the original proposal of Ghirardi, Grassi, and Benatti (1995) .
A schema for relativistic collapse theories
Relativistic spacetimes
We assume a spacetime equipped with a causal order, that is, a relation of causal precedence, assumed to be transitive and antisymmetric (that is, if p causally precedes q, then q does not causally precede p). Two spacetime points are said to be causally unconnected if they stand in no causal order, that is, if neither pq nor qp obtains. Because no point is in the causal past of itself, the relation of being causally unconnected is reflexive. That it is symmetric follows straightforwardly from its definition. Two distinct points that are causally unconnected are said to be spacelike separated.
In Galilean spacetime, the relation of being causally unconnected is transitive, and, therefore, is an equivalence relation, and the spacetime can be portioned into equivalence classes of simultaneity. In Minkowski spacetime, on the other hand, for any two points p, q that are spacelike separated from each other, there are other points r that are spacelike separated from p but not from q. Define a relativistic spacetime as one in which, for any spacelike separated p, q, there exists a point r that is spacelike separated from p, such that rq .
A causal curve is a curve such that, for any pair of distinct points p, q, either pq or qp . A Cauchy surface is a set of spacetime points that is intersected exactly once by every inextendible causal curve. A spacetime that contains Cauchy surfaces is said to be globally hyperbolic.
We will, in what follows, assume a globally hyperbolic relativistic spacetime. We can define the relation  between Cauchy surfaces: If ,   are two Cauchy surfaces, then     when no part of one if no part of   is in the causal past of  . This relation is reflexive and transitive, and hence is a partial order on Cauchy surfaces.
Collapse theories in relativistic spacetime
A collapse theory modifies the deterministic, unitary evolution so as to produce something like the textbook collapse. Gisin (1989) has demonstrated, on the assumption that the evolution is Markovian (meaning that future states depend only on the present state, and not on any details about the past that aren't reflected in the present), that any deterministic, nonlinear dynamics for quantum states that does not respect a certain linearity condition permits signalling-if two spatially separated systems are in an entangled state, a choice of experiment on one can influence probabilities of outcomes of experiments performed on the other.
The relevant condition is the following.
Linearity. Let T be a dynamical map on the set of pure states of a system. Let 
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As Kent (2005) has argued, though violations of linearity permit signalling, this need not be superluminal signalling. Nonetheless, ordinary quantum mechanics does not allow operations on one system to be used for signalling to another system, unless there is an interaction term between the two systems in the Hamiltonian, and we will assume that the no-signalling condition holds, and hence that the evolution is linear. This means that (unsurprisingly) a theory that produces collapse must be a theory with indeterministic dynamics. Instead, there will be some set of alternatives { ( ) }    , which we take to be indexed by a 11 parameter  that takes on values in a set  . We expect our theories to specify, given two surfaces ,  , with     , and the state vector ()  , the set of alternatives   ( ) ,      , and also a probability distribution over the possible values of  . Suppose that, with respect to some background measure  , this probability distribution is represented by a density function () p  .
With this apparatus in place, we can define a mixed state, ( ; )     as the weighted average over the possibilities for the state on   , given ()  , which we will call evolution operators, such that, for some  , 
Consider two Cauchy surfaces ,  , with 
use ()
 or ( ; )     for computing probabilities of results of experiments that she is about to undertake, and these should yield the same probabilities for outcomes of those experiments. The necessary and sufficient condition for this is that evolution operators that implement evolution through a given spacetime region  should commute with operators representing observables at spacelike separation from  .
These conditions give us a rather general schema for a quantum theory with stochastic dynamics on a relativistic spacetime. It includes, as a special case, deterministic, unitary evolution, in which case the set of evolution operators pertaining to any region of spacetime is a singleton set.
Concrete theories will fill in the details, specifying, in particular, what the sets of evolution operators are. Maudlin (1996: 301-302 ) raised the question of consistency of state assignments derived from different hypersurfaces passing through a given region. If two hypersurfaces  ,   having a region  in common, yielded reduced states that were orthogonal to each other, in the sense of yielding conflicting definite (probability equal to unity) predictions for the outcome of some experiment, this would be problematic.
Beables for relativistic collapse theories
Intrinsic and extrinsic states of a spacetime region
Compatibility of extrinsic states
The question arises: do the conditions on collapse dynamics outlined above guarantee that the differing extrinsic state assignments obtained from different Cauchy surfaces are not in outright conflict with each other? It can be shown (see Myrvold 2003 Myrvold : 489, 2016 ) that these conditions suffice to guarantee that the states states ()   and ()    are not orthogonal. In fact, a stronger sense of compatibility obtains. The question of the compatibility of reduced states derived from states on different Cauchy surfaces is essentially the same as that addressed by Brun, Finkelstein, and Mermin (2002) . They demonstrate that state assignments that can represent information about a system available to different observers are compatible, in the sense that they have overlapping support.
The context in which Brun et al. work is that of finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. However, essentially the same conclusion holds in a setting appropriate to quantum field theory. In this 15 context we cannot assume a finite-dimensional Hilbert space, nor can we assume that the mixed state of a bounded region  obtained from a pure state on a Cauchy surface containing  admits of a decomposition into pure states. We must take care to formulate the condition in a manner that is independent of assumptions such as these.
We assume a von Neumann algebra () R  , whose self-adjoint elements represent the bounded observables pertaining to the forward domain of dependence of  . Let  be a normal state of () R  (that is, a completely additive state). We define the support projection for  as the orthogonal complement of the union of all projections in () R  to which  assigns expectation value zero.
With these definitions in hand, it can be shown that, given a set   , , ,...
    
of Cauchy surfaces containing  , then on the assumption that there is a Cauchy surface containing  that is nowhere to the past of any of them (which, in particular, will always be the case for any finite set of Cauchy surfaces), the corresponding set of states   ( ), ( ), ( ),...
overlapping support. See Appendix for details.
Local beables for collapse theories
Suppose that we have a collapse theory that yields near-eigenstates of an appropriate dynamical quantity. For example: the natural extension to the relativistic context of a mass-density would be the components of the stress-energy tensor. Assume that we have an appropriate relativistically invariant smearing function (see Bedingham 2011a,b) , and formulate smeared operators ˆ( ) Tx  , representing a smeared stress-energy density centred at the point x. For any state  , we can define
The 00-component of this is the relativistic analogue of the mass density that has been proposed as an appropriate ontology for nonrelativistic collapse theories. Where, then, may we find local beables for a relativistic collapse theory? There are, in the literature, two proposals for extending the fuzzy link to a relativistic context. One is what might be called the agreement criterion, formulated by Ghirardi, Grassi, and Pearle (1991): We think that the appropriate attitude is the following: when considering a local observable A with its associated support we say that an individual system has the objective property a (a being an eigenvalue of A), only when the mean value of Pa is extremely close to one, when evaluated on all spacelike hypersurfaces containing the The other criterion is the past light cone criterion, formulated by Ghirardi and Grassi (1994: 419; see also Ghirardi 1996 Ghirardi : 336, 1999 Ghirardi : 139, 2000 Ghirardi : 1364 . On this criterion, a system is said to possess the property A=a when the expectation value of Pa is extremely close to one, evaluated on the past light-cone state.
If the criterion for property attribution were an exact eigenstate-eigenvalue link-that is, if we were ascribing a property A=a only when the expectation value of Pa is exactly equal to onethen the two would be equivalent. The past light-cone state of a region  is an eigenstate of an observable A pertaining to  with eigenvalue a if and only if the state on every Cauchy surface containing  is. On the fuzzy link, the agreement criterion entails the past light-cone criterion, but the past light-cone criterion does not guarantee satisfaction of the agreement criterion; it only entails that the agreement criterion will hold with high probability.
If the property attribution criterion is meant to supply local beables, then it is clear that what is wanted is the past light-cone criterion and not the agreement criterion. The agreement criterion makes reference to events at spacelike separation from the region in question. Moreover, as Ghirardi, Grassi, Butterfield, and Fleming (1993: 358) have shown, a choice regarding experiments performed at spacelike separation from  can affect the probability that the agreement criterion is satisfied. Consider a case of two spin-½ particles, located in world-tubes A and B. We take initial conditions on a Cauchy surface 0  , and suppose that the particle in A is undisturbed in the interval between 0  and some later Cauchy surface 1  . Let  be a spacelike slice of A between 0  and 1  .
Let 0  , 1  be the intersections of B with 0  and 1  , respectively. We will take 0  and 1  such that 0  and 1  are to the past, and future, respectively, of  (see Figure 3) . eigenstate of spin for the particle in A that the accessibility criterion is satisfied. Thus, on the past light-cone criterion, we ascribe + spin in the z-direction to the particle in A as a possessed property. Suppose that Bob, located near B, has a choice of whether to perform a spin experiment on B. Suppose that, if he doesn't, the pair of spin-½ systems is effectively isolated from outside interference, and that in that case our collapse theory assigns, for some  smaller than  , probability 1− that the state will remain undisturbed in the interval between 0  and 1  , in which case the agreement criterion for property attribution is satisfied. If Bob chooses to do a spin experiment on the particle in B, there is probability  that he will obtain the result − . If he does, then the state of the combined system on a Cauchy surface 2  that includes  and runs to the future of Bob's experiment will not be a state in which the particle in A is close to a + eigenstate for spin-z; on the contrary, it will close to a -eigenstate for spin-z. In such an eventuality, the agreement criterion for ascribing 'spin-z = +' to the particle in A is not satisfied. Now, if the threshold for satisfaction of the accessibility criterion is stringent enough-say,
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-40 , as suggested by Pearle (1997) -then the probability of disagreement between the past lightcone criterion and the agreement criterion is sufficiently low as to be negligible, whether or not Bob chooses to do an experiment. However, it is still true that the value of this negligibly low probability depends on Bob's choice regarding his experiment, and hence, if we were to apply the agreement criterion for outcome attribution, this would require acceptance that the theory exhibits parameter dependence, albeit a very weak parameter dependence (see Ghirardi, Grassi, Butterfield, and Fleming 1993 for discussion). If, however, we adopt the past light-cone criterion, then (as noted already by Ghirardi and Grassi 1994) , there is no parameter dependence at all, not even very weak dependence. The conclusion to be drawn is that local beables for a relativistic collapse theory are to be identified according to the past light-cone criterion.
As mentioned, Ghirardi, Grassi, and Benatti (1995) have argued that a theory on which, at the macroscopic scales, a smeared mass density is almost always near-definite yields an adequate picture of the world. Combined with the past light-cone criterion, this gives a past light-cone matter density ontology, discussed by Tumulka (2007) and, in more detail, by Bedingham et al. (2014) .
Conclusion
There is a sensible ontology for collapse theories in a relativistic context. Moreover, considerations of what it takes for a theory to represent a world that contains, among other things, objects like our experimental apparatus, to be thought of a local beables, determine the form that this ontology takes. It is one on which all dynamical quantities are distributional in character. In spite of this distributional character, dynamical quantities may hace effectively precise values (in the sense that they behave, to a high degree of approximation, as if they have precise values); it is the goal of a collapse theory to ensure that the properties of macroscopic objects almost always have this character. Beables local to a bounded spacetime region are to be evaluated via the past light cone state of that region.
Appendix
We consider a finite set of Cauchy surfaces   
We assume a Hilbert space that contains vectors
If     , and  is in the overlap of  and   , then the region between  and   is spacelike separated from  . Therefore, K  commutes with all self-adjoint elements of () R  .
The restrictions of the states on the Cauchy surfaces 12 , ,..., n    are states (which will typically be mixed states) of ()
We do not assume that these are represented by density operators in () R  , or that they are mixtures of pure states of () R  , as this is not needed in what follows.
As mentioned in the main text, the projector onto the null space of any state  of () R  is the union of all projections P that have zero expectation value in  , and the support projection of  is the orthogonal complement of the projector onto the null space. We will call the null space Proof. This is immediate from Lemma 1.
From this follows the result concerning overlapping support of { ( 1 ), ( 2 ), … , ( )}. In standard quantum field theories on Minkowksi spacetime, it is assumed that there is a unitary representation of the group of spacetime translations, with infinitesimal generators P  that satisfy the spectrum condition:
For any future-directed timelike vector a, the spectrum of Pa is in + This ensures positivity of the energy, with respect to any reference frame.
We assume a unique vacuum state that is invariant under all spacetime symmetries. Define The proposition is less trivial for theories that introduce nonstandard fields, and whose states go beyond the standard Hilbert space, as do the relativistic versions of CSL due to Bedingham (2011a, b) and Pearle (2015) . It can be shown, for any indeterministic theory formulated within the framework sketched in Section 3 that is set in Minkowski spacetime, it is necessary to go beyond the standard Hilbert space (see Myrvold 2017 
